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Micro-sociology refers to human action in very short periods 
of time and small expanses of space. Macro-sociology deals 
with human action over long periods of time and covering large 
spaces. This is a continuum; at the micro end, analysis of con-
versation or emotion that involve rhythms in fractions of sec-
onds; at the macro end, the entire world-system in the longue 
durée; with meso-level phenomena in between. (i.e. the spec-
trum between Emanuel Schegloff and Immanuel Wallerstein, 
with room for Norbert Elias and Charles Tilly in-between.) Micro 
and macro are not ontologically different. We are more likely 
to use nouns for dealing with macro processes, and to see 
process when we look at anything in micro detail. Micro is al-
ways nested within macro, since surrounding any few moments 
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in time there are more actions stretching out in time and space. 
And macro is always composed of micro; it is not different, it 
is more.  
How does this perspective help us to analyze causes and 
consequences of violence? Macro nouns – state, class, cul-
ture, war, revolution – always can be viewed up-close in their 
micro-processes; but one can argue that it is the connected-
ness that makes a difference. The unique excitement of a rev-
olutionary moment is the feeling that what is happening here 
is happening among other people gathered elsewhere, and 
that in this far-reaching collective attention the noun-like so-
lidity of the state is up for redefinition. But this can also turn 
out to be an illusion, as the post-revolutionary period may 
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Micro-sociology analyzes very short expanses of time and space, macro-sociology long expanses.  There is no historical trend from micro to 
macro techniques of violence or vice versa; but changes result from stalemates of older technique, shifting to either a faster or a longer sequence 
of violent moves; advantage goes to the side which catches their opponent emotionally off balance. Prolonged stalemated struggles are destruc-
tive wars of attrition. Successful revolutions concentrate masses of people on a dramatic showdown in a central place, and can result in a rapid, 
low-casualty transfer of power. Comparing failed and successful revolutions, the more micro-concentration in time and place, the more likely a 
rapid tipping point will occur through a shift in emotional domination. But where revolutionary struggle becomes spread out, it turns into civil 
war, which become especially destructive when outside allies supply weapons to keep it going. Moving along the continuum towards the macro 
end de-emphasizes emotional turning points and motivates opponents to win by attrition. Moving towards the micro end allows the possibility 
of a quick and less destructive resolution.  
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show. Instead of treating this as a philosophical or meta-theo-
retical issue, let us see what we learn substantively about vio-
lent processes at different scales.  
 
1. Micro-situational Violence 
Micro-interaction is what is seen in photos and videos, which 
necessarily capture a small amount of time and space. At the 
micro-level, the patterns of violence can be summarized as fol-
lows (Collins 2008).  
When persons are close together, face-to-face, locked into 
the intersubjectivity of seeing each other’s eyes and respond-
ing to each other’s emotional expressions, anger may be ex-
pressed in the build-up of a conflict; but at the moment some-
one actually becomes violent their expression changes to 
tension and fear. This is confrontational tension: phenomeno-
logically it produces perceptual distortions; physiologically it 
generates a racing heart beat, an adrenaline rush that at high 
levels results in loss of bodily control. For this reason, most 
close-range violence is incompetent; either the antagonists are 
unable to get through the barrier of confrontational ten-
sion/fear and the fight aborts or stalemates; or if violence hap-
pens, it is generally wild and inaccurate, missing its target, hit-
ting the wrong person, sometimes hitting one’s own side.  
There are five main pathways to circumvent the barrier of 
confrontational tension. The first and most fundamental is at-
tacking the weak, especially someone who is emotionally dom-
inated. Persons who are successfully violent find a target who 
is debilitated by high levels of confrontational tension, while 
keeping their own tension down to a moderate level where they 
can still operate. Emotional domination does not come primar-
ily from weapons, because weapons are often used incompe-
tently; emotional domination is the intersubjective feature of 
the interaction, and it precedes most of the physical damage. 
In riots the most common pattern of successful violence is 
when a small group of five or six attacks an isolated individual 
who has fallen to the ground and has their back turned, so that 
face confrontation no longer exists. A very destructive version 
at a larger scale is what I have called a forward panic, where 
an entire group (sometimes a military unit) becomes tangled 
up in a human traffic jam or bogged down in passivity, where-
upon the other side goes into a frenzied attack and massacres 
the unresisting enemy. 
First pathway can be summarized as: emotional domination, 
attacking the emotionally weak. Second pathway: social sup-
port from a coordinated group of fighters, who concentrate 
more on the intersubjectivity of their mutual action than on 
confrontation in the face of the opponent. Third pathway: 
fighting in front of an audience tends to make the fighters a 
social elite, more concerned with what the audience thinks of 
them, making their opponent a collaborator in the perfor-
mance. Fourth pathway: violence without face confrontation, 
including striking at a distance, especially with military weap-
ons. Another variant – fifth pathway – is a clandestine attack, 
where the attacker pretends there is no confrontation until the 
very last minute; this is the technique of suicide bombers, and 
more traditionally mafia assassins who lure their victim into an 
unguarded moment and attack at close range and from be-
hind. 
These five patterns hold at the micro-level. Micro is what we 
see in photos. When sociologists turn towards the macro-level, 
the detail of the situation disappears; what remains are statis-
tics, usually selected on the dependent variable: taking the 
cases when killing or wounding happens, and matching them 
with non-situational background markers like race or class. But 
race does not kill anybody; it is a static factor, persisting across 
situations (Black 2011). Even when racial antagonism be-
comes a motive it still has to pass through the eye of the nee-
dle, the barrier of confrontational tension. Is it possible to 
bridge the gap between the operative causes – what happens 
in the micro-situation – and the aggregate statistical results?   
 
2. Aggregating Techniques of Micro-violence into Macro 
Statistics 
In most confrontational situations, a small number of those 
present account for virtually all of the violence. What does this 
imply? On closer investigation, we find the most persistently 
violent persons have developed distinctive techniques of being 
violent. Armed robbers learn how to choose situations where 
they are emotionally dominant, and how to intimidate their vic-
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tims by dramatic performances. If they do not learn these tech-
niques, they are unsuccessful in pursuing a career of crime. 
Highly skilled professionals in violence, such as mafia hit-men, 
have specialized techniques of surveillance and assassination 
that they pass along among their members. Mafia techniques 
are very different than those of street gangs, who are in fact 
quite incompetent in violence and rely on bluster to intimidate 
others, and the random chance of occasionally hitting some-
one. Street gangs avoid going into mafia neighborhoods, since 
the gangs are mystified by the secrecy with which the mafia 
operates.  
My argument is that aggregate statistics of violence increase 
when techniques for overcoming confrontational tension are 
learned and spread by imitation. One recent example is suicide 
bombing. It was invented in Sri Lanka by the Tamil Tigers, 
spread to Lebanon, and then more widely throughout the Mus-
lim Middle East and into Africa (Hopgood 2005; Ricolfi 2005). 
Suicide bombing is the perfect weapon for the low-tech side in 
asymmetrical war; it is the most cost-effective way of causing 
damage to the enemy; it is cheap in equipment, yet extremely 
accurate because the carrier delivers the bomb all the way to 
the target (Pape 2005). Its main cost is willing bomb-carriers; 
this helps explain why suicide bombing is popular mainly in 
regions where human capital is low. 
A very different style of violence was invented with the rise of 
the youth gang, beginning in New York after World War II 
(Schneider 1999). Before that time, criminal gangs were 
adults mostly concerned with profit, but as secondary educa-
tion spread and working-class youth were no longer entering 
the labor force in their mid-teen years, gangs formed as lower-
class social clubs that built their reputation by fighting with 
each other. Michael Eisner’s data on the crime surge from the 
1950s to the 1990s suggests that its main cause was the rise 
of alienated youth culture – that is, a great deal of casual, dif-
fuse violence was popularized along with the prestige of the 
gang style (Eisner 2008). I mentioned that gangs are not very 
competent at their violence, and most of it happens so to 
speak by accident; but that is part of the dramatic appeal of 
the gang life; and their incompetence at violence makes gang 
life more survivable for most of its members. 
 
The dissemination of techniques of violence, then, is a mech-
anism that aggregates micro-techniques into macro-level 
trends. But what about declining trends? Here the hypothesis 
is that particular kinds of violence decline when they are coun-
tered by techniques on the opposing side. For instance, in the 
late 1990s the New York Police Department started using a 
computer system named COMSTAT that immediately updated 
where crimes were happening in the city, enabling the police 
department to flood those streets with extra patrols (this sys-
tem replaced older crime statistics that were gathered on a 
yearly basis, and were useless for tactical action). COMSTAT 
effectively moved policing more into the meso-level of the mi-
cro-macro continuum. Not all cities have the same resources 
as New York (35,000 police), but these are the kinds of coun-
ter-tactics that have shifted crime rates, in some places more 
than others. At the same time, police adopted a very strict line 
on minor violations, which has given rise to more defiance of 
the police especially by racial minorities (here the shift is to 
increase pressure in more micro-situations). It is hard to get 
accurate data on the correlates of police use of violence, but 
a reasonable hypothesis is that police shootings increase 
where these tactics of constant petty harassment are used. In 
this perspective, the crime rate – and the police violence rate 
– are both products of the back-and-forth escalation and coun-
ter-escalation of techniques of violence. 
We see a similar pattern of imitating successful forms of vi-
olence in the mass school shootings that began in the United 
States in 1982, and spread as they were more widely publi-
cized. There have always been isolated and alienated youths 
in schools, but what they learned were the techniques of col-
lecting a hidden arsenal, wearing gear than avoids facial con-
frontation, and clandestinely springing their attack upon easily 
dominated victims (Collins 2014). These tactics, widely publi-
cized in the news media when used in schools, have since 
around 2015 become adopted for attacks in other public 
places such as sporting events and shopping malls. 
 
3. Meso-level Techniques for Overcoming Confrontational 
Tension 
Coming now to more organized violence, one can read the 
entire history of military violence as a succession of techniques 
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for overcoming confrontational tension. Tribal war was largely 
carried out in face-to-face skirmishes in which both sides did 
a great deal of shouting but only a few warriors attacked briefly 
with spears and arrows before running away; in this respect, 
quite a lot like gang fights. The phalanx, marching together in 
a tight line, was an invention that created group solidarity; it 
was most effective when fighting disorganized tribal warriors 
(as in the case of Caesar’s legions in Gaul). When a phalanx 
fought another phalanx, the result was usually a stalemate un-
less more complicated tactics were developed; the most im-
portant innovation was keeping some troops in reserve to be 
put into action when the situation was most chaotic. Instead 
of a single melee, the army was reorganized into segments that 
could be sent into action at different times. The tendency for 
confrontational tension to make fighting incompetent in the 
melee was turned into a strategic advantage by generals like 
Caesar, who waited until all the engaged troops were disor-
ganized, then launched still-organized formations held in re-
serve against them. It was a matter of seizing the moment 
when organization could beat disorganization, by moving up 
the time continuum from the micro to the meso level.  
In the early firearms era, marching into combat was the cru-
cial technique. It kept troops from running away; and since 
muskets were very inaccurate at more than forty meters, their 
main effect came from firing simultaneously from a fixed for-
mation as the enemy came near; thus, the outcome of battle 
depended heavily on trying to terrify the enemy into breaking 
up their formation. But by World War I, machine guns had be-
come so deadly that marching into battle became suicidal. In 
1918, the German army invented a new form of attack; the 
Germans called it Stoßtruppen or storm troopers, who were 
trained to disperse in small groups, hiding in the rough terrain 
of the battlefield, until they got close inside the enemy lines 
(Biddle 2004). This style of fighting was quickly imitated by the 
Western allies; the old technique had ceased to function, while 
the new one was capable of breaking through static front lines. 
 
1 These meso-level techniques can be seen as 
larger-scale counterparts to the micro-pathways for 
overcoming confrontational tension. Caesar’s tactic 
of launching reserve troops against disorganized 
enemies is an upscaled version of micro pathway 
Here the innovation was to descend the macro-micro contin-
uum; meso-size masses of troops with heavy weapons pro-
duced a stalemate of bloody attrition; this was circumvented 
by going downward to the level of small, flexible groups of elite 
troops, relying on high interpersonal morale and local initia-
tive.1 
I will not mention all the kinds of military innovations since 
World War I, but only stress that all techniques depend upon 
their social effectiveness: that means, reducing confrontational 
tension on one’s own side, while establishing emotional dom-
inance over the enemy, especially by breaking down enemy 
organization and hence breaking down their morale. In World 
War II, the blitzkrieg of May 1940 was not so much a technical 
innovation in using tanks but a way of forcing a huge, unwieldy 
organization to change its position rapidly. The French army 
had as many tanks as the Germans, but dispersed among in-
fantry units so that their speed of movement was slowed to 
that of the foot soldiers they accompanied. The German all-
mechanized units achieved a deep breakthrough which turned 
into a race in which the Allies were constantly trying to reor-
ganize along a new front, but instead collapsed as the effort to 
shift troops, weapons, and supplies became chaotic. The Bat-
tle of France caused relatively few casualties for the numbers 
involved because the war of momentum was so decisive, and 
most of the massive French forces were demoralized into sur-
render as they recognized their own hopeless disorganization. 
The French army was not demoralized at the time of the initial 
breakthrough; but during three weeks of failure to get into a 
defensible position, it felt itself defeated emotionally. Morale 
is organization; when organizational coordination is lost, mo-
rale falls; and vice versa.  
There is a lesson here about the speed of movement on the 
micro-macro continuum: The French army of 1940 was one 
enormous macro-structure, which limited its speed. The Ger-
man army split off some semi-autonomous units designed for 
high speed, a move down the continuum towards the meso 
level. It is differences in speed that determine the success or 
no. 1, attacking the weak; the fixed formations of 
the musket era are the upscaled version of micro 
pathway no. 2 where the strongest group alignment 
wins; Stoßtruppen are an upscaled version of no. 
5, the clandestine stealth attack. I owe these sug-
gestions to an anonymous reviewer. 
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failure of organized violence, at whichever points along the 
continuum the difference occurs. In this case, meso-level 
speed broke down the enemy’s organization and morale, into 
a macro-chaos that can be seen as chains of cascading con-
nected micro-situations.2  
 
4. Micro-concentration or Macro-attrition 
The last part of my analysis will weave together two themes 
that are highly visible in today’s large-scale political and mili-
tary conflicts. One is the combination of guerrilla war and ter-
rorism, which we can understand as a series of innovations in 
social techniques for fighting on the weaker side in an asym-
metrical war. But this also leads to wars becoming drawn out 
in time and space. The other theme is the difference between 
tipping-point conflicts, which are sudden shifts in power based 
on emotional domination, and long, drawn-out attrition wars. 
Rapid tipping points can happen in military battles, but they 
are also the mechanism of revolutions, including some fairly 
peaceful ones; and thus the contrast here encompasses two 
points along the micro-macro continuum. My point is that the 
more micro a conflict is (the more concentrated in time and 
space), the better its chances of being resolved without much 
damage; the more macro the conflict (the more spread out it 
is), the more physical damage it produces. 
 
4.1. The Dispersed Battlefield Breeds Terrorism 
Let us briefly sketch the history of guerrilla war. The tactic of 
hit-and-run ambushes against a surprised and undefended en-
emy is very old, and existed in tribal war before state organiza-
tion. What distinguishes modern guerrilla warfare is that it is 
used in resistance against a large-scale, state-organized army, 
and it combines hit-and-run ambushes with hiding among the 
civilian population. The term was invented in the 1808–1814 
Peninsula War in Spain, where Spanish guerrillas succeeded 
in tying down very large French forces and thus drained Napo-
leon’s resources. This was also one of the first modern political 
wars, since efforts to ferret out the guerillas from among their 
civilian collaborators resulted in well-publicized massacres, 
 
2 Of course, new technologies play a role on the 
material level, and have different material requi-
sites as well as uses to which they can be put. The 
which stirred up yet further resistance. The pattern was set: 
both sides mobilizing against each other morally, as a war of 
competing atrocities. The key point is that the guerrilla war is 
decentralized, and whenever the advantage to one side is very 
great – in organization and equipment – the weaker side can 
continue to fight only by matching, not strength against 
strength, but temporary and local strength against local weak-
ness. 
I have already mentioned that after 1918, the firepower of 
machine gun became so great that tightly organized frontal as-
sault became suicidal. The result was that all modern armies 
decentralized into dispersed combat teams, even in large-
scale battles (Biddle 2004). As firepower has become even 
more devastating, and modern transport and delivery systems 
developed into rockets, jet planes, and helicopters, the battle-
field has become increasingly dispersed: rarely are there front 
lines to conquer or defend, but instead a checkerboard of ad-
vanced bases that are supplied either by air – which is very 
expensive – or by trucks, which are vulnerable to guerrilla at-
tacks. Bits of high-tech can be cheaply adopted by the weaker 
side, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) detonated 
by mobile phones. This produces the current pattern where 
guerrillas hide in nearby civilian houses, which become vulner-
able to counter-attack by American or other Western troops, 
setting up atrocities that become part of the recruiting effort 
and political appeal of the insurgents.  
It is only one more step to terrorism, which is guerrilla-style 
clandestine attacks on weak targets, in this case not hitting 
military targets, which are capable of fighting back, but attack-
ing civilians. We see terrorist attacks on unarmed civilians as 
atrocities; but the terrorists see exactly the same justification 
in what they do, as a response to what we have done. 
Now to come back to the micro/macro perspective. Terrorist 
tactics and counter-tactics are the result of protracted war 
fought out over large amounts of time and space. A large 
amount of space means that the stronger force must spread 
out, but this creates logistics problems and uncertainty over 
where an attack will happen. Long amounts of time create 
key point is how they affect the socio-emotional mi-
cro mechanisms of violent antagonism. This is true 
even when weapons operate on the macro level to 
produce long-term attrition; but combat rarely ends 
with total annihilation of the fighting forces of the 
conquered side; the breaking point is almost al-
ways a shared emotion of futility. 
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boredom – lots of dead time in which nothing is happening 
(Ender 2009), which is also an emotional vacuum that guerril-
las and terrorists can exploit in order to benefit from surprise. 
To complete the circle, being surprised also leads to emotional 
responses that create atrocities, or what are perceived as 
atrocities; and so both sides continue to feel the moral incen-
tive and justification for continuing the cycle of attack and re-
venge, precluding any political solution to bring peace. This is 
a very pessimistic picture, but I will add another aspect that at 
least gives some favorable moments.  
 
4.2. Concentrated Tipping Points in Revolution and in 
Battle 
Revolutions are spectacular and dramatic events, when they 
succeed, above all because they are quickly decisive. Their 
central dynamic is a tipping point. The ingredients are these: a 
large number of people assemble at a central place: Tahrir 
Square in Cairo in 2011, Petrograd in 1917, Versailles and 
then Paris in 1789; Paris again in 1830 and 1848. All the 
major political actors are concentrated there, and the attention 
of the rest of the society is focused there as well. The existing 
regime commands organized force, the army and police, but 
revolution begins to be possible when troops become emotion-
ally affected by the immediate atmosphere, refuse to use force 
against the political insurgents, and eventually some go over 
to their side. This creates a crisis inside the small network of 
top officials of government and the army. Sometimes the offi-
cial leader – the Czar in February 1917, King Louis Philippe in 
1848 – loses their nerve and abdicates in favor of a royal rel-
ative, but the mood of political-emotional low energy spreads 
so that no one wants to step into the post (Tocqueville 1987). 
That is an easy tipping point, the top government collapsing 
and allowing the most prominent insurgents to step into the 
apparatus of control. Sometimes there are more protracted 
splits between elite factions; efforts at repression are at-
tempted, but these continue to be resisted as long as the in-
surgents keep up their focus of attention and emotional reso-
nance, such as the Petrograd Soviet, or the continuing 
assemblies at Tahrir Square. The key to resistance is in the 
emotional atmosphere, the sense that the government elite is 
split, and that some will eventually decide to shift to the revo-
lutionary side. When this happens, the tipping point is passed; 
as they shouted in Tahrir Square, “the army and the people are 
one hand!” (Ketchley 2014). 
 
5. Conclusion 
What happens after the tipping point is another important 
chapter in our analysis of revolutions; as Trotsky said, making 
a revolution is easy, consolidating it is harder. But I will leave 
aside the question of who ends up in control after the period 
of consolidation, and what kind of regime emerges, in order to 
emphasize a larger analytical contrast: the distinction between 
concentrated tipping-point conflicts, and dispersed attrition 
conflicts. 
When there is a concentrated focus of attention in one place, 
there is a possibility that emotional domination will occur; one 
side becomes an emotional magnet and attracts everyone into 
its orbit; the other side becomes an emotional drain whose 
members flee. This tipping-point mechanism happens in small-
scale fights, but also in revolutions and in battles. To summa-
rize very briefly the sociology of battle victory and defeat: Wars 
have both a material side and a morale side; high morale is 
most effective when it enables an organization to execute rapid 
maneuvers that break down the enemy organization, hence 
one-sided battles where one side takes few casualties and the 
other side has huge losses. But when neither side achieves 
emotional domination, and both organizations remain at the 
same level of solidarity or indeed the same rate of decline, war 
is decided by material factors. It becomes a war of attrition; 
victory goes to the side with the deepest pockets, the strongest 
industry, or the most manpower to use up. This is the most 
costly way to win a war, and in the long run the most demoral-
izing.  
The same set of alternatives applies to revolutions. Revolu-
tions at the outset are much nearer the micro end of the con-
tinuum; they contain the potential for establishing emotional 
domination – either by the insurgents or by the regime – and 
the conflict will end. But revolutions also can become stale-
mated, where both sides mobilize equally. In that case, revo-
lution turns into civil war. What determines which way it will 
go? Rapid-turning-point revolutions happen only where they 
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are concentrated at a central place; this was the case in Egypt 
and Tunisia (and Bahrain, where the regime won) (Bramsen 
2017). But where the revolution is dispersed, it is impossible 
to have a rapid resolution; a tipping point in Benghazi is not a 
tipping point in Tripoli. Once it becomes a dispersed civil war, 
it also opens the possibility of becoming even more dispersed, 
as external states and political movements send aid or troops 
to different factions, guaranteeing that the conflict will go on 
even longer and more destructively. This is the Syrian scenario, 
where an attempt to imitate the Egyptian revolution met strong 
resistance from a regime that was not at all emotionally dom-
inated, leading to the end of peaceful methods and dispersion 
into a civil war dividing the territory into multiple enclaves. And 
multi-sided wars are even more destructive and protracted 
than two-sided civil wars. Add to this the pattern of dispersed 
combat and asymmetrical weapons that fosters terrorism: the 
result is the humanitarian nightmare that has shattered Syria 
and created a huge refugee crisis spreading across Europe.  
The main theoretical point is this: Micro is a small amount of 
time and space; it is not necessarily a small number of people, 
as huge numbers can be concentrated in a revolutionary mo-
ment or a battle. Concentrated conflicts have a chance for 
rapid and decisive resolution, if emotional domination ensues. 
But if conflict remains stalemated, it disperses into a macro-
conflict; and these are inherently much more destructive, both 
physically and morally. Humaneness depends on pressing for 
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